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ERISA STOCK DROP CASES:
AN EVOLVING STANDARD
CRAIG C. MARTIN

I.

& ELIZABETH L.

FINE*

INTRODUCTION

In 2000, after several years of record growth, the stock
market bubble popped. A public that was used to seeing its
investments grow wanted to hold someone responsible for their
losses. Plaintiffs began to file suit against publicly traded
companies that underwent significant declines in their stock
prices under suspect (and sometimes non-suspect) circumstances.
In addition to suits under federal securities laws, publicly traded
companies that made their stock available to employees for
retirement investment have also faced litigation from their
employees under The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Companies that made stock available to their
("ERISA").
employees through any of a number of options, including
Employee Stock Option Plans ("ESOPs"), matching programs
under 401(k) plans, or simply allowed employees to choose
employee stock as an investment option in the 401(k) plans all saw
ERISA suits. In well-known bankruptcies such as Enron, the
public companies, their Board of Directors, and relevant
committee members have had to mount defenses to both securities
and ERISA litigation. While the cases center around the facts
leading up to a decline in a company's stock price, the two types of
litigation have critical differences. While shareholders must prove
scienter to recover in securities cases,' employees whose
retirement funds were invested in company stock through an
. Craig C. Martin is a partner in Jenner & Block's Chicago office. He is
the Chair of the firm's ERISA Litigation Practice and is a member of the firm's

Litigation and Dispute Resolution Practice. He also serves on the firm's
Management Committee. Mr. Martin obtained his J.D. from the Harvard Law
School in 1988. Ms. Fine is an associate in Jenner & Block's Chicago office.
She is a member of the firm's Litigation and Dispute Resolution Practice. Ms.
Fine obtained her J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School, where she
graduated cum laude.
1. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
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employer-sponsored retirement program need only show that a
fiduciary duty has been breached to recover in ERISA cases.'
Part II of this Article will discuss the standards of liability for
securities fraud under section 10 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Part III of the Article will then discuss the
standard of liability for parallel litigation under ERISA. Part IV
of the Article will provide a general overview of the universe of
cases that have alleged breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
when stock prices have dropped and will highlight several
significant ERISA stock drop cases. Part V will discuss the
significant differences between the two types of litigation. Next,
Part VI of the Article will discuss the potential downfalls of the
two different standards, particularly as litigation of both types
increases. Finally, Part VII of the Article will outline potential
solutions to the discrepancy in standards.
II. SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10 AND RULE

1OB-5 OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
A. History of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 and Early 10b-5
Securities FraudCases
Before the stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting
Depression, there was no federal regulation of the securities
market.' In response to reports of widespread fraud and abuse in
the securities industry leading up to the crash, Congress enacted
the Securities Act of 19334 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.' The 1933 Act "was designed to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of
securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and,
through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing."' The Act required
that companies issuing securities to the public register with the
federal government and disclose material information to
prospective investors. 7 "The 1934 Act was intended principally to
protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through

2. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226 (2000).
3. THOMAS EARL PATRON ET AL., SECURITIES FRAUD: LITIGATING UNDER
RULE 10B-5 § 1.2 (2001).

4. Ch. 38, 73 Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2000)).

5. Ch. 404, 73 Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj).

6. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
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regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in overthe-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national
securities exchanges."8 The 1934 Act created the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), authorized the Commission to
promulgate a wide array of regulations, and mandated disclosures
in the context of the purchase and sale of securities.9 The 1934 Act
specifically states that regulation is necessary to, among other
things, "insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets." °
Section 10 of the 1934 Act prohibits any person from using
any means of interstate commerce, national security exchanges, or
the mail:
in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered
on a national securities exchange,... any manipulative or deceptive

device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."
While section 10 does not actually prohibit any specific
conduct on its own, it gives the SEC broad power to promulgate
rules relating to fraud in the securities markets. Eight years after
the 1934 Act was enacted, in response to allegations that corporate
executives were buying stock on inside information," the SEC
strengthened the anti-fraud and deception provisions of section 10
by promulgating Rule 10b-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.1

8. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj.
10. 15 U.S.C § 78b.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (emphasis added).
12. PATRON ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.4.

13. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices,
§ 240.10b-5 (2004).

17 C.F.R.
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Since its promulgation more than sixty years ago, Rule 10b-5
has provided the basis for a large number of securities fraud suits.
Within a decade after Rule 10b-5 was promulgated, courts
began to hold that the rule created a private right of action for
securities fraud," a viewpoint that was later adopted by the
Supreme Court." Courts also held that controlling insiders have a
duty to disclose to minority shareholders, 6 and that a plaintiff in a
10b-5 action must be a purchaser or seller of securities." In 1971,
the Supreme Court addressed its first piece of 10b-5 litigation in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.'8 In
this case, the Court held that 10b-5 offers protections to corporate
purchasers and sellers as well as individuals 9 and liberally
construed section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to apply to fraud in
securities transactions whether or not they took place in an
organized market."
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")" in order to "discourage perceived abuses in
private securities litigation." 2
The Act seeks to increase the
participation of institutional investors by allowing any putative
class member to seek to be the lead plaintiff,"' creating a safe
harbor for certain forward looking statements' and adding
liability for aiding and abetting 5 and proportionate liability. 6
Over the past several years, fallout from corporate scandals has
led to a large increase in the number of securities lawsuits filed. 7
While many of these lawsuits settle or get dismissed, a number
remain in litigation, and additional suits continue to be filed. 8
B. Essential Elements of a 10b-5 Claim
In order to make a successful fraud claim, a plaintiff must

14. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-15 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
15. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
16. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951).

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
404 U.S. 6, 11 (1971).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
PATON ETAL., supra note 3, § 1.11.
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3).
Id. § 77-z-2(c).
Id. § 78-t.
Id. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B).
Markets: Securities FraudSuits Hit Record in 2002, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8,

2003, Business 3, at 4.

28. Jonathan D. Glater, From Investor Fury, a Legal Bandwagon, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, § 3, at 1.
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prove that the alleged action meets all elements of Rule 10b-5.
The plaintiff must show that: the act is a type of manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance that takes place through interstate
commerce, mail, or the securities exchange;29 the plaintiff made an
actual purchase or sale of a "security"; ° the defendant acted with
scienter;3' the purchase or sale was in reliance on the fraud and
that the information relied upon was material;2 and finally that
the misrepresentation actually caused the loss.'
First, the act in question must meet one of the three forms of
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance[s]"34 as defined in
Rule 10b-5. Subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 deal with
actual conduct, while subparagraph (b) deals with making or
failing to make a statement.' However, in practice it is difficult to
make distinctions between the different types of conduct and
statements prohibited under Rule 10b-5. 6 Additionally, the 1934
Act requires that the deceptive or manipulative device or conduct
giving rise to the claim must take place through an
instrumentality of interstate commerce, the mails, or a national
security exchange.37
Second, a plaintiff must make an actual purchase or sale of a
security. 8 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the
plaintiffs argued that an "overly pessimistic" prospectus was
"materially misleading" and deterred them from purchasing
securities that they had the right to purchase. 9 The Supreme
Court noted that the risk of allowing a claim based on a plaintiffs
failure to sell or purchase securities is that "the door will be open
to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one who offers
only his own testimony to prove that he ever consulted a
prospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to it, or that
the representations contained in it damaged him."
Therefore,
only actual purchasers or sellers may seek relief under Rule 10b-

29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
30. Id.
31. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Constitutes Business Sufficient to
Show Necessary Element of Scienter in Civil Action for Damages Under § 10(b)
of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j)(b)) and Rule 10b-5 of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 A.L.R. FED. 392 (2004).
32. Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1041, 1057 (1984).
33. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249 (1977).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5(a)-(c); PATTON ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.4.
36. PATTON ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.4.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.

38. Id.; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735 (1975).
39. 421 U.S. at 726-27.
40. Id. at 746.
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5 41

Third, the purchase or sale must be of a "security."
term "security" is defined in the 1934 Act to mean:

The

any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust
certificate,
preorganization
certificate
or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relation to
foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as
a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance, which has a maturity at the time of issuance not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.4
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court held that a
security is a flexible principle, "one that is capable of adaptation to
meet the countless and variable schemes" to create profit out "of
the money of others.' The Court has applied the following factors
in deciding whether a transaction involves a security: (1) the
motivations that would prompt a reasonable buyer and seller to
enter into the sale; (2) whether or not there is common trading for
speculation or investment; (3) the reasonable expectations of the
investing public; and (4) whether or not other regulatory
protections make the Securities Act unnecessary.'
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, in order to make a
successful 10b-5 claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
acted with scienter.4 "When a statute speaks so specifically in
terms of manipulation and deception, and of implementing devices
and contrivances-the commonly understood terminology of
intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no more
expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 755.
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
Id. § 78c(a)(10).
328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1990).
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214.
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statute to negligent conduct." 7 The Court has defined scienter as
the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."' Most courts have
ruled that extreme recklessness is enough to meet the standard of
scienter.4 ' One district court has even ruled that knowledge that a
statement is false, together with the knowledge that the plaintiffs
or a third party would rely upon the information, has been held
sufficient to meet the burden of scienter. °
Fifth, a plaintiff in a 10b-5 must also prove that he or she
purchased or sold the security in reliance on defendant's fraud.5'
"Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."" To prove
reliance in the case of silence, "[a]ll that is necessary is that the
facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this
decision."' The Supreme Court has also supported a "fraud-onthe-market" rebuttable presumption theory of reliance: "Because
most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an
investor's reliance on any public material representations,
therefore, may be presumed.4
Sixth, a plaintiff must prove that the information relied upon
was material.55 Information is "material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding" whether to buy, sell, or hold.' Finally, and
closely related to reliance and materiality is the concept of
causation. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 both
require that the actionable wrong be "in connection" with the sale
or purchase of a security.57 Plaintiff must therefore prove that the
misrepresentation actually caused the loss.'

47. Id. at 213.
48. Id. at 193.
49. PATRON ETAL., supra note 3, § 2.6.
50. In re N. Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 626 (N.D.
Ga. 1981).
51. Ernst,425 U.S. at 206.
52. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
53. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
54. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.

55. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
56. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231.
57. Superintendentof Ins., 404 U.S. at 12.

58. Id. at 12-13.
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C. Who May Be Held Liable Under 10b-5 Litigation?
1.

General Theories of Liability: Direct and Control

There are several different parties and types of parties that
may be held liable under a 10b-5 claim. First, any defrauding
party may be held liable.59 Misinformation is enough to give rise
to liability; the defendant does not need to be a buyer or seller.'
The 1934 Act also creates liability for a "control person," as
"[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
The PSLRA gave the SEC authority to prosecute
liable."6'
individuals who aid and abet violators of the 1934 Act.6" An aidor
or abettor is "any person that knowingly provides substantial
assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this title,
or of any rule or regulation issued under this title."' An aidor or
abettor is liable to the same extent as the primary violator."
2.

Specific Classes of Individuals that Have Been Held Liable

Directors, officers, and controlling shareholders have been
held liable through both the direct violator and control person
theories of 10b-5 liability.' Several circuits have held that the
power to control the offender is enough to create control liability,
while other circuits have held that the defendants must be
"culpable participants" in the act.' Accountants and auditors that
certify a company's financial statements have also been held
liable."
Both the PSLRA and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have
increased an auditor's responsibility to design audit plans that
Attorneys can be held directly liable for
detect fraud.
Brokers, investment
misrepresentations in legal opinions.'
advisers, underwriters, and banks all have also faced liability.69

59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
60. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968).

61. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
62. Id. § 78t(e).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir.
1981).
66. PATTON ET AL., supra note 3, § 3.501.
67. Id. § 3.502.
68. See Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive Indus. 1980, 694 F. Supp. 1057
(S.D.N.Y 1988); Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 659 F. Supp. 1539 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985).
69. PAtrON ETAL., supra note 3, §§ 3.504-06.
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FIDUCIARY LIABILITY FOR DECREASES IN STOCK VALUE IN

ERISA CASES

A. ERISA and Stock Drop Suits
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197470
("ERISA") is the federal law regulating all employee benefit plans,
including defined benefit pension plans. "Employers are not
required to establish employee benefit plans, but if they choose to
do so, they must abide by ERISA."7' Since the stock market bubble
burst, many of the breach of fiduciary duty cases have alleged that
fiduciaries have mismanaged plan funds by investing imprudently
in employer stock and/or that fiduciaries failed to disclose material
information to plan participants.

B. Who Is a FiduciaryUnder ERISA?
ERISA liability in stock drop cases arises from breach of
fiduciary duty. While beneficiaries also have a claim under
securities laws, they may be owed a heightened level of duty.
Under ERISA:
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan,
or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan. Such term includes any person
designated under section 405(c)(1)(B) [29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1)(B)]. 12
It is commonly stated that a fiduciary may wear two hats and
be an employer as well as a fiduciary.73 Fiduciary status is not an
all or nothing concept; a "party is a fiduciary only as to the
activities which bring the person within the definition."7 4
"[F]iduciary status under ERISA is to be construed liberally,

70. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2004).

71. In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (2003)
[hereinafter WorldCom I].

72. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
73. WorldCom 1, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
74. Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1996).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:889

consistent with ERISA's policies and objectives."75 A fiduciary may
be named in the plan, or be a functional fiduciary, meaning "that
the defendant has become a fiduciary not because of the plan
terms, but because the defendant has exercised fiduciary
authority.""
Public companies, officers, directors, benefits and finance
committee members, and directed trustees are among the groups
that have been sued as fiduciaries under ERISA. The question of
which of these groups may be ultimately held liable under ERISA
depends largely on how a plan is structured. While risk to the
company, officers, and directors can be minimized to delegating
plan administration and investment duties to committees or
trustees, the risk can never be eliminated if company stock is
offered as an investment option. At a minimum, the board must
retain the duty to oversee plan administration or investment
committees.
C. FiduciaryDuties Under ERISA
Fiduciaries have five affirmative duties under ERISA. First,
the fiduciary must act "solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries" and for the exclusive purpose of benefiting the
plan's participants.7 7 Second, the fiduciary must act "with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of a prudent person "acting in
a like capacity." 8 Third, the fiduciary must diversify the plan's
investments in order to decrease its risk of loss." Fourth, the
fiduciary must act in accordance with the provisions of the plan
documents to the extent the documents comply with ERISA."
Fifth, the fiduciary must refrain from engaging in any transaction
expressly prohibited under ERISA.8 '
1.

The Duty of Loyalty

The most basic duty imposed by ERISA on fiduciaries is a
duty of loyalty to their plan beneficiaries.82 An ERISA fiduciary'

75. In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. "ERISA" Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665
(E.D. Tex. 2004) [hereinafter In re Elec. Data Sys. I] (quoting Tittle v. Enron
Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "Erisa" Litig.), 284 F. Supp. 2d
511, 543-44 (S.D. Tex. 2003)).
76. Id. at 668.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
78. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
79. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
80. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
81. Id.
82. Id. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1106.
83. See supra Part III.B.
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must "discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries," and for the
"exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries."'
The duty of loyalty applies in situations
where the fiduciary is faced with a potential conflict of interests,
such as the situation where the trustee of a pension plan also has
responsibilities to the entity (e.g., employer or union) sponsoring
the plan. Thus, litigation of the duty of loyalty has arisen most
often in the context of self-dealing transactions, such as where a
plan's fiduciary uses plan assets to benefit non-beneficiaries.'
ERISA fiduciaries are not completely forbidden from engaging
in transactions which incidentally benefit themselves or third
parties; however, "their decisions must be made with an eye single
to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries" they
represent.' Fiduciaries violate the duty of loyalty when acting in
a manner which does not place the interests of their beneficiaries
ahead of all other interests, such as where a trustee issues a risky
or low-interest loan to the employer corporation from a plan's
assets. 7 Courts in such cases have broad discretion to award
equitable relief such as ordering all unlawful loans to be repaid
with a reasonable rate of interest, or removing the defendant as a
fiduciary and prohibiting him from resuming fiduciary capacity
until the plan receives all sums owed.'
2.

The Duty of Care

In addition to the duty of loyalty, ERISA imposes a stringent
duty of care, which requires that the fiduciary act with "the care,
skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then

84. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
85. See generally Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, "Dual Loyalty"
Considerationsin DeterminingPropriety, Under Employee Retirement Security
Act, (29 USCS §§ 1001 et seq.), of Actions of Officers of Sponsor Corporation
Serving as Trustees of Employment Pension Plan, 64 A.L.R. FED. 602 (1983).
86. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982). See also
Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 1999); Metzler v.
Graham, 112 F.3d 207, 209-13 (5th Cir. 1997); Boyle v. Anderson, 68 F.3d
1093 (8th Cir. 1995).
87. See, e.g., Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding breach of fiduciary duty when union pension fund issued a loan to

union's convalescent fund because the administrators "should have known the
loan presented an unreasonable risk of not being timely and fully paid"). See
also Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 350 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (finding
breach of fiduciary duty when plan trustee renewed a loan in employer
company "despite the declining financial condition of the Company" and the
declining security on the loans).
88. See Marshall,465 F. Supp. at 354.
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prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims."89 Courts
consider this to be "an unwavering duty on an ERISA trustee to
make decisions with single-minded devotion to a plan's
participants and beneficiaries and, in so doing, to act as a prudent
person would act in a similar situation." The duty of prudence
includes a duty to disclose to the beneficiaries material
information a reasonable fiduciary would believe to be in the best
interest of the beneficiaries to disclose. 91
The "prudent person" test focuses on the process that the
fiduciary undertakes in reaching a particular decision involving
plan assets. Most courts begin this inquiry by determining what
the plan trustees knew at the time the investment decision was
made, and then deciding whether or not that decision was that of a
"prudent person."9 One district court has held that this duty only
requires the trustee to "vigorously and independently investigate
the wisdom of a contemplated investment; it matters not that the
investment succeeds or fails."93 Further, under Department of
Labor regulations interpreting ERISA, a fiduciary may be subject
to personal liability if it fails to investigate fully the terms and
consequences of an investment, fails to investigate the
qualifications of its advisors, or fails to acknowledge those facts
and circumstances that, given the scope of its duties, it knows or
should "know are relevant to the particular investment or
Conversely, courts have
investment course of action involved."
usually found that trustees have satisfied their duty of care when
they hire independent consultants to perform studies regarding a
proposed transaction and subject those studies to close scrutiny
when making decisions regarding an investment.95

89. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

90. Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984).
91. Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund. v.
Newbridge Sec. Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1181 (3d Cir. 1996).
92. See Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984); Am.

Communications Ass'n, Local 10 I.B.T. v. Retirement Plan for Employees of
RCA Corp. & Subsidiary Cos., 488 F. Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
93. Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1238 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
94. See Investment Duties, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(1)(i)(2004). See also

Whitfield v. Cohen, 682 F. Supp. 188, 194-195 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
95. See Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1244.
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D. Plaintiffs Relief if a FiduciaryDuty Is Breached
ERISA provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach,
and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have
been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.9
A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary
to recover benefits or for injunctive or equitable relief.97

IV. ERISA STOCK DROP LITIGATION CASES
A.

Universe of ERISA Stock Drop Cases

As of January 25, 2005, there have been approximately fifty
court decisions in cases that allege breach of ERISA fiduciary duty
after employer stock significantly declined. The outcome of these
cases varies widely. Many of the reported decisions in ERISA
cases arise from a defendant's motion to dismiss. In others, the
courts make a summary judgment ruling. While many settle, if
the defendants do not prevail at the summary judgment stage, in a
few, courts have certified classes, and in a rare instance or two,
the claims have actually gone to trial. A summary of these cases
may be found in Tables A through L.
1.

Defendant'sMotion to Dismiss

Most of the reported ERISA stock drop decisions come from a
defendant's motion to dismiss.
Defendants that the court
determines are not fiduciaries (or that the court determines that
the plaintiff has not pled adequate facts to support an allegation
that the defendants are fiduciaries) frequently win on motions to
dismiss.98 However, at times, the courts have ruled that the
determination of whether an individual or entity is an ERISA

96. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
97. Id. § 1132(a).
98. See, e.g., Crowley v. Coming, Inc., No. 02-CV-6172 CJS, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 758 (W.D.N.Y Jan. 14, 2004); In re La.-Pac. Corp., ERISA Litig., No.
02-1023-KI, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2003); Worldcom I,
263 F. Supp. 2d 745.
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fiduciary is a question of fact not properly resolved on a motion to
dismiss."
Courts have held that in the motion to dismiss context,
simply signing an SEC filing or incorporating an SEC filing into a
summary plan description does not create a fiduciary duty," and
that ministerial employee members of the plan committee were
However, ERISA courts have also ruled that
not fiduciaries.'
fiduciaries cannot forget information that they learned in other
capacities, 2 and plaintiffs' allegations that the fiduciaries knew
there were misrepresentations in SEC filings and encouraged plan
participants to read those filings, are sufficient to overcome a
motion to dismiss.103
Courts have granted a directed trustee defendant's motion to
dismiss when the plaintiff has not made allegations that the
directed trustee knew of the directing fiduciary's malfeasance."
Courts have also held that a directed trustee has a "duty to
distinguish between proper and improper instructions," and a
plaintiffs allegations that the directed trustee knew or should
have known about the directing fiduciary's breach can overcome a
defendant's motion to dismiss. 5 When a plaintiff did not state a
claim for plan-wide relief under ERISA section 1132(a), the court
A
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment."
defendant's motion was also granted when a plaintiff failed to
state a claim for breach of ERISA's exclusive purpose
requirement." 7

99. See, e.g., In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. ERISA Litig., No. 02 C 8324, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3241 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004); In re Xcel Energy, Inc., Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Minn. 2004); Nelson v.

Ipalco Enters., No. IP02-0477-C-H/K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2431 (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 13, 2003).
100. See, e.g., In re Tyco Intl, Ltd., Multidistrict Litig., No. 02-1335-PB, 2004

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24272 (D.N.H. Dec. 2, 2004); Worldcom 1, 263 F. Supp. 2d at
766.
101. See, e.g., In re Tyco, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24272, at *13-14.
102. See, e.g., Worldcom 1, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
103. Schied v. Dynegy, Inc. (In re Dynegy, Inc. "ERISA" Litig.), 309 F. Supp.
2d 861 (S.D. Tex. 2004); In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 03-2202-JWL,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19125 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2004).
104. See, e.g., Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.
2004); Lalonde v. Textron, Inc., 369 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004).

105. Kling v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 132, 150-51 (D.
Mass. 2004); Tittle v. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
106. In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 03-1204, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16265, at *45 (D.N.J. June 28, 2004).
107. Pa. Fed'n, Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Norfolk S. Corp.
Thoroughbred Ret. Inv. Plan, No 02-9049, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *3738 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2004).
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In several cases the courts have ruled that it is inappropriate
to determine whether an ESOP fiduciary has breached his or her
duties at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceeding and that
additional facts are needed to determine whether a plaintiff can
overcome the presumption of reasonableness for an ESOP
fiduciary to invest in employer stock"° or failure to diversify ESOP
holdings out of employer stock." Keeping that in mind, courts
have granted motions to dismiss when plaintiffs do not allege facts
that overcome the presumption that an ESOP fiduciary's decision
to remain invested in company stock is reasonable.' 10
In at least one case, the plaintiffs alleged adequate facts to
establish a claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duty by failing to prudently manage the plan, failing to disclose
facts regarding the company, failing to avoid a conflict of interest,
and failing to monitor plan investments.'
Courts have also held
that companies and members of the pension committee have a
fiduciary duty to monitor appointed fiduciaries."'
A plaintiffs
allegations that a defendant with a fiduciary duty to monitor and
evaluate the performance of company stock as an option breached
that duty, because he knew or should have known of the problems
with the company, are sufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment."3 Allegations that a corporation knew that a
benefit committee, for which the corporation had the duty to
appoint and remove, breached its fiduciary duty are enough to
withstand a motion to dismiss.""
Courts have also held that the heightened pleading
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) do not
apply to breach of fiduciary duty claims not based on fraud."'

108. Lalonde, 369 F.3d at 4; Tittle v. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 511; In re

ADC Telecommunications, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 03-2989 ADM/FLN, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14383 (D. Minn. July 26, 2004).
109. Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.J. 1992).
110. Wright v. Or. Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d at 1090; Landgraff v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 230 Fed. Appx. 366 (6th Cir. 2002); In re
Duke Energy ERISA Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d 786 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
111. Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
112. Kling, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 142-43; Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
2d 1079, 1097 (N.D. Ill. 2004); In re Sprint, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19125, at

*23.
113. Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 167 (D. Mass. 2003); Tittle v.
Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63; In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig., 312 F.
Supp. 2d 898, 916-17 (E.D. Mich. 2004); In re Sears, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3241, at *22-23.
114. In re Dynegy,, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 904; In re Elec. Data. Sys. I, 305 F.
Supp. 2d at 661.
115. In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821-22 (S.D. Ohio 2004);
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Finally, some courts have held that respondeat superior is a viable
theory of liability under ERISA.116
2.

Summary Judgment

Courts have refused to grant summary judgment when a
material issue of fact on fiduciary status or duty remains.
Although a court granted a plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment as to the issue of whether directors were fiduciaries, it
was not appropriate as to the issue of whether their duty was
breached."' Where the directed trustee had no discretion, it could
not be a fiduciary and therefore could not breach a fiduciary
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
duty."9
defendants because the purchase of a corporation.. and the
decision to transfer funds from one trust to another during a
merger 2 ' was a business decision and did not trigger an ERISA
fiduciary duty.
An appellate court overturned an order granting summary
judgment on the grounds that though an ESOP fiduciary is
entitled to a presumption of acting consistently with ERISA, the
presumption may be overcome if the plaintiff can establish that
Another appellate court
the fiduciary abused its discretion.
affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that the defendants
did not act improperly in failing to distribute stock under an ESOP
or in failing to diversify ESOP funds, and that "purely business
decisions by an ERISA employer are not governed by" the
fiduciary standards.'
One court entered summary judgment on behalf of the
plaintiffs because the fiduciaries "did not engage in a good faith
determination of the fair market value" of the stock." Another

In re Elec. Data Sys. 1, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 658; In re Xcel Energy, 312 F. Supp.
2d at 1165; In re La.-Pac. Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645; Nelson, 2003

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4580, at *12-14; Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 865
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
116. In re Reliant Energy ERISA Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 646, 658 (S.D. Tex.
2004); Howell v. Motorola, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.

117. Beam v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 02-CV-0682E(F), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15744, at *11-12 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2003); Glaziers & Glassworkers, 93 F.3d

at 1182.
118. Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., N.A., 234 F. Supp. 2d 872, 884 (C.D. Ill. 2002).
119. Maniace v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 40 F.3d 264, 267 (8th
Cir. 1994).

120. Armstrong v. Amsted Indus., Inc., No. 01 C 2963, MDL 1417, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14776, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2004).
121. Steinman v. Hicks, 352 F.3d. 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2003).
122. Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1456 (6th Cir. 1995).

123. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., 285 F.3d 415, 437 (6th Cir. 2002).
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court ruled that summary judgment on behalf of the defendant
plan administrator was appropriate, since the plan trustee "had
the sole responsibility for diversifying Plan investments under
ERISA" and the trust agreement also assigned responsibility to
the trustee for diversification.124
3.

Class Certification and Settlement

Classes have been certified in at least three cases.' After the
class was certified in In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., the parties
settled, permitting plan participants to direct the employer to
match any of the plan's investment options. 26 In In re WorldCom,
Inc. ERISA Litigation, the class was certified after the parties
reached a settlement agreement, but before the court approved
that agreement. 7 It seems that in cases where there are serious
allegations of corporate malfeasance, including simultaneously
pending criminal and securities fraud cases, settlement is more
likely.12
4.

Trial

Very few ERISA stock drop cases have gone to trial. In one
case that went to trial, the court entered judgment on behalf of the
defendant because the plaintiffs (after surviving several motions
to dismiss) "failed to prove that any of the Defendants breached
In another case, the court entered
their fiduciary duties. " "
trial
holding that the defendants did not
judgment after a bench
"attempt to conceal material information or knowingly [make]
anything less than full disclosure," and the ESOP did not pay
more than adequate consideration for employer stock. 2'

124. Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 722-23 (6th Cir. 2000).
125. In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 02 Civ. 4816 (DLC), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20671, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2004) [hereinafter WorldCom II];
In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. "ERISA" Litig., 224 F.R.D. 613, 634 (E.D. Tex.
2004) [hereinafter In re Elec. Data Sys. II]; In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 457, 468 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (settled by Whetman v. IKON
Office Solutions, Inc. (In re IKON Office Solutions Sec. Litig.), 209 F.R.D. 94
(E.D. Pa. 2002)).
126. In re IKON, 191 F.R.D. at 457.
127. WorldCom 11, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20671, at *42.
128. See infra Section IV.B.3, 5 (providing a discussion of the WorldCom and
Enron settlements).

129. Thompson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., No. 99-3439, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2318, at "18 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2003).
2004).
130. Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 818 (C.D. Ill.
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B. SignificantERISA Stock Drop Cases
Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the
number of ERISA cases used as a litigation tool when a public
company's stock faces a serious decline. As a result, federal courts
have begun to develop common law for ERISA fiduciary duty.
This section will highlight some of the most significant ERISA
stock drop cases.
1. Varity Corp. v. Howe:131 The Mother of PresentDay Stock Drop
Cases
In Varity Corp., a group of beneficiaries of a firm's employee
welfare benefit plan sued the plan's administrator, who was also
their employer, claiming that the administrator misled them into
withdrawing from the plan which caused them to forfeit benefits. 3 '
In the mid-1980s the employer became concerned that some of its
business "divisions were losing too much money."" To remedy the
problem, the employer transferred all of its money losing divisions
to a newly incorporated subsidiary with the plan that along with
transferring the divisions, they would transfer the debt.'
One of
the debts that they were hoping to eliminate was the obligation to
pay benefits to employees of the money losing divisions.'
The
employer convinced the employees of these failing divisions of the
company to switch employers to the new subsidiary, which would
therefore release the parent employer from obligation to pay
benefits. 3 ' To persuade the employees to make the move to the
new division, the management convened a meeting and reassured
the employees that their benefits would be secure after the
switch."7 However, the employer knew from its inception that the
newly created subsidiary would be unable to pay the transferring
employees' benefits.'
The Supreme Court noted that the law of trusts will often
inform an effort to interpret ERISA fiduciary duties. 9
Courts
should be required to balance the competing interests of protecting
employees' benefits and avoiding a system that is so complex that

131. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
132. Id. at 491.
133. Id. at 492-93.
134. Id. at 493.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 497.
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it discourages employers from offering benefits in the first place. "
The Court affirmed the district court's finding that the employer
"was wearing its 'fiduciary,' as well as its 'employer,' hat" when it
The
made misrepresentations regarding employee benefits.'"
and
it
significantly
employer was acting as a fiduciary "when
to
"participate
and
that
deliberately misled" the employees,
knowingly and significantly" in deceiving beneficiaries is to act
against the interest of the participants and is therefore a breach of
a plan administrator's fiduciary duty." Furthermore, the Court
held that ERISA authorizes lawsuits for individualized equitable
relief for breach of fiduciary duties.'"
2. Moench v. Robertson: Employers May Be Held Liable for
Imprudent Investments in ESOPs
In Moench, a former employee sued the ESOP under ERISA
for breach of fiduciary duty based on the investment committee's
decision to continue to invest in employer stock when the financial
state of the employer was deteriorating.' s From the period of July
1989 through May 1991, the employer's stock declined in price
from $18.25 per share to less than twenty-five cents per share. " 7
During this period, federal regulators repeatedly expressed
concern to the board of directors regarding the employer's
financial condition. 14 As part of its benefits plan, beginning in
1986, the employer provided employees with the opportunity to
invest in the company ESOP.14 The employer would "match up to
50% of an employee's voluntary contribution" to the ESOP. 1'
Duringt the relevant time period, and despite the drop in price,
the plan investment committee continued to invest in employer
stock."' In 1992, a former employee and ESOP plan participant
brought suit against the administrator of the plan, the ESOP
committee.152

140. Id.

141. Id. at 498.
142. Id. at 492, 505.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 506.
Id. at 515.
Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 559.
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The court recognized that the primary purpose of an ESOP is
to give the employees the opportunity to invest in their employer's
stock." They are not intended to guarantee retirement benefits
and inherently place "retirement assets at [a] much greater risk
than does" a typically diversified retirement plan." However, an
ESOP is still subject to ERISA's stringent requirements, and
"ESOP fiduciaries must act in accordance with the duties of
loyalty and care."'55 The Court held that "an ESOP fiduciary who
invests the assets in employer stock is entitled to a presumption
that it acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of that decision.
However, the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by
establishing that the fiduciary abused its discretion by investing
in employer securities."" 6 If a "fiduciary cannot show that he or
she impartially investigated the options, courts should be willing
to find" that the ESOP fiduciary breached its duty."7
3.

In re WorldCom:

Outlining Liability for CorporateParties

In mid-2002, WorldCom announced that it had improperly
reported earnings and expenses and issued a massive restatement
of its financial reports."' Approximately a month later, WorldCom
filed for bankruptcy, 6' and WorldCom executives ultimately pled
guilty to violations of securities laws.'
WorldCom was the
sponsor and administrator of several retirement plans that
offered, as an option, employees the opportunity to invest in
employer stock.'
The WorldCom ERISA litigation was brought
on behalf of plan participants "whose individual accounts held
shares of WorldCom stock from September 14, 1998, until the date
of filing of the Complaint," alleging that defendants knew or
should have known by this point that continued investment in
WorldCom was imprudent."
Plaintiffs alleged that WorldCom
officers, directors, employees, auditors, and the plan trustee
breached their fiduciary duty to plan participants by continuing to
allow employees to imprudently invest in employer stock."
M

153. Id. at 568.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.

158. WorldCom I, 263 F. Supp. 2d. at 745.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 752.
at 753.
at 754.
at 754-56.
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When the defendants moved to dismiss the case in 2003, the
court held that a fiduciary under ERISA is a functional status."
Individuals are fiduciaries to the extent that they have control
over the plan." An ERISA fiduciary must act "with 'an eye single'
to the interests of plan beneficiaries and participants." 7 The
court held that the WorldCom officers that neither acted as
fiduciaries, nor were appointed ERISA fiduciaries, could not be
held liable for breach of fiduciary duty, and therefore the court
dismissed the claims against those officers."
Additionally, the
court held that only the Employee Benefits Director was alleged to
have had and exercised discretionary control over the plan and
dismissed the claims against the other employees. 9 It also held
that incorporation of SEC filings into the summary plan
description was insufficient to establish fiduciary liability. 7 '
However, "[wihen a corporate insider puts on his ERISA hat, he is
not assumed to have forgotten adverse information he may have
acquired while acting in his corporate capacity."'
An ERISA
fiduciary may not knowingly present false information regarding a
plan investment option to plan participants, and "[t]here is no
exception to the obligation to speak truthfully when the disclosure
concerns the employer's stock." 7' An individual does not become
an ERISA fiduciary by signing an SEC filing; however, ERISA
fiduciaries who disseminate false information in those filings to
plan participants breach their fiduciary obligations. 3
The claims surviving the defendant's motion to dismiss,
including breaches of the fiduciary duty of prudence, duty to
provide complete and accurate information, and duty to monitor,
were brought against WorldCom (as the plan sponsor and
administrator), Merrill Lynch (as the plan trustee), and
WorldCom's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and
Employee Benefits Director in January 2003.' At the end of June
2004, all defendants except Merrill Lynch and Sullivan, as well as
the issuers of certain WorldCom insurance policies, executed a
settlement agreement.'
The agreement created a settlement fund

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 757.
Id.
Id. at 758 (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth,680 F.2d at 271).
Id. at 759-61.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 759.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 766.
Id.
WorldCom 11, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20671, at *7-8.
Id. at *11.
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of $47.15 million to be allocated to class members proportionately
to their losses. 176 On 177October 18, 2004, the court approved the
settlement agreement.
4. Wright v. Oregon Metallurgical Corp.:
Favorable to the Defendants

8

A Case Unusually

In 1987, The Oregon Metallurgical Corporation ("Oremet")
created a stock bonus pension plan (the "Plan") that required a
minimum percentage of each participant's portfolio be invested in
employer stock as part of an Eligible Individual Account Plan
("EIAP"). 1 9 "The Plan originally allowed participants to sell up to
40% of the Oremet shares in their individual stock accounts" while
employed by Oremet.'8
During the mid-90s, the stock price
steadily rose, and plan participants wanted a greater ability to sell
their Oremet stock."'
Management became concerned that
employees would terminate their employment in order to exercise
their options to sell additional stock, and so the plan was amended
to allow participants to sell increasing amounts during the course
of 1996.182 The Union opposed this diversification and made a side
agreement with management that prohibited further amendment
of the plan that would permit any additional diversification
through 2000.1" In 1997, Oremet merged with another company,
and the plaintiffs wished to amend the benefit plan to allow
participants to sell a higher percentage of employer stock than
permitted by the original plan, so that they could take advantage
of the higher stock price resulting from the merger; but because of
the side agreement with the Union, the plan administrators
refused to enact a plan amendment."
In March 2001, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that Oremet
violated ERISA's exclusive purpose provision by deferring to the
Union's judgment and by failing to make prudent investment5
decisions regarding continued investment in employer stock.1
Despite the fact that EIAPs are exempt from ERISA's
diversification requirements and percentage limitations in an
employer's securities, ERISA's prudence requirement applies to
M

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at *11-13.
Id. at *43.
Wright v. Or. MetallurgicalCorp., 360 F.3d at 1090.
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1095.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1095-96.

185. Id. at 1099-1100.
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EIAPs.'" However, stock fluctuations alone are insufficient to
establish the imprudence required to rebut the Moench
presumption.'8 7 The defendants, therefore, did not violate ERISA's
prudence requirement."8 While the plaintiffs argued that the
defendants violated ERISA's exclusive purpose provision, 89 ERISA
does not create a sole duty to maximize benefits for plan
participants."9 ERISA requires a fiduciary to comply with a plan
as written, unless it is inconsistent with ERISA, and because the
defendants complied with the plan's lawful terms and were under
no legal obligation to deviate from those terms, they did not violate
their fiduciary obligation. 1
5. Enron: Moving ERISA Common Law Forward
"The rapid collapse of Enron Corporation ('Enron') and the
resulting scope, variety, and severity of losses are unprecedented
in American corporate history."'92 In late 2001, plaintiffs filed a
class action lawsuit against Enron and Arthur Andersen in the
Southern District of Texas.9
The complaint alleged that the
defendants engaged in insider trading while making false and
misleading
statements
about
the
company's
financial
performance."
Employees who were participants in three
employee benefit plans filed additional allegations that defendants
breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA.95
On the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court addressed
several major ERISA fiduciary duty questions. First, the court
held that an ESOP fiduciary does not escape ERISA duties of
loyalty, prudence, and care;" however, "an ESOP trustee is
entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently with ERISA" in
investing in employer stock.9
Second, "[t]he most fundamental
duty of ERISA plan fiduciaries is a duty of complete loyalty."98

186. Id. at 1097.
187. Id. at 1099.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.

192. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA"
Litig.), 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
193. Press Release, University of California, University of California Joins

Class Action Suit Against Senior Enron Management and Arthur Andersen
LLP (Dec. 21, 2001), httpJ/www.ucop.edu/news/archives/2001/dec2lartl.htm.

194. Id.
195. Tittle v. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 530.

196. Id. at 534.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 546.
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Third, to determine whether a fiduciary acted with prudence, the
court must look at how the fiduciary acted with respect to the
selection of the investment, not the ultimate outcome.' Fourth, if
there is a conflict between the plan documents and ERISA, ERISA
Fifth, the court held that corporate directors
policies prevail."
have a duty to monitor plan fiduciaries."' Sixth, fiduciaries have a
duty to communicate material information to the beneficiary, 2°
and while a fiduciary has no duty to violate securities laws, there
is nothing to stop a fiduciary from disclosing material information
to all stockholders.' 3 Seventh, a directed trustee of an ESOP has a
duty to "keep apprized of the company's financial condition to the
extent that a trustee can determine whether its stock is an
appropriate, i.e., prudent, investment," and therefore may only be
liable when the trustee knows or should have known about the
directing fiduciary's breach.'
Based on these principles of fiduciary liability, the court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ERISA
In mid-2004, the parties reached a settlement
complaints.
agreement which was preliminarily approved by the court.0 5 A
hearing was held on the settlement agreement in August 2004,
and the court has not yet issued a decision.
V.

MOST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

ERISA AND

SECURITIES LAW LIABILITY: COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITIES LAW

DOES NOT GUARANTEE PROTECTION FROM ERISA LIABILITY
To make a successful securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant, acting with scienter, used a
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in interstate
commerce, the mail, or a securities exchange, and that the
plaintiff relied upon this information, which was material, in his
or her purchase of a security, and suffered a loss as a result of that

199. Id. at 547-48.
200. Id. at 549.

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 555.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 591.

205. Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913, Order Preliminarily Approving

Partial Settlement Conditionally Certifying Class for Purposes of Settlement,
Approving Form and Manner of Notice, & Scheduling Hearing on Fairness of
Settlement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(E) (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2004).
206. Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Enronerisa.com: 401(k) Litigation: Settlement,
available at http://www.enronerisa.com/settlement.html (last visited Mar. 17,

2005). Keller Rohrback will post the court's decision on this website
immediately.
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0 '
reliance."
In order to make a successful ERISA claim, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant was a fiduciary, breached his
fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of plan participants,
failed to act as a prudent person in like capacity, failed to diversify
the plan's investments in order to decrease the risk of loss, failed
to act in accordance with plan documents, or engaged in any
transaction expressly prohibited by ERISA."
Since ERISA
liability arises from a fiduciary duty to plan participants, there are
potential situations in which actors comply with all relevant
securities law, yet still face liability under ERISA.

A. ERISA Duty to Disclose Is More Restrictive than Securities
Law DisclosureRequirements
Under ERISA, some courts have arguably held that
fiduciaries have an affirmative duty to disclose any information
that a plan participant would find useful in making investment
decisions," while securities law limits the information that a
corporation must disclose in certain periodic reports and requires
that other individuals with inside information simply refrain from
trading based on that information before it is disclosed to the
market. 10
"The duty of disclosure under ERISA has been described as
'an area of developing and controversial law.'"21' One circuit held
that the duty of ERISA fiduciaries to inform is "not only a negative
duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when
the trustee knows that silence might be harmful."'12 However, the
standard for disclosure is not yet clear. In 1995, the Norfolk
Southern Corporation established a 401(k) retirement plan known
as "TRIP" (Thoroughbred Retirement Investment Plan)."' The
plan created two accounts for each employee, one holding
individual contributions, and the other holding the employer's
matching contributions. 4
Employees could invest their
contributions in a number of different funds, including a fund
consisting of Norfolk Southern stock, while the employer's
matching funds were placed into the Norfolk Southern stock
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
209. Glaziers & Glassworkers, 93 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Bixler v. Cent. Pa.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1994)).

210. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1.
211. In re Xcel Energy, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (quoting Tittle v. Enron, 284
F. Supp. 2d at 555).
212. Glaziers & Glassworkers, 93 F.3d at 1180.
213. Pa. Fed'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987, at *2.

214. Id. at *3.
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fund."15 Prior to 2002, employees were not given the option to
transfer the matching funds to another investment option.216 By
October 2000, Norfolk Southern stock had dropped from its 1998
high of forty dollars a share to twelve dollars a share." 7
Throughout the time period that the stock value dropped, Norfolk
Southern continued to make its matching contributions in Norfolk
Southern stock, and continued to offer the Norfolk Southern fund
as an investment option for employees.2 18 The district court ruled
that the standard for disclosure was not clear, and in January
2005, the court certified to the Third Circuit the question:
Does ERISA require the fiduciaries of a 401(k) plan that offers
employment stock as an investment option to disclose to plan
participants non-public information, acquired by the fiduciaries in
their capacities as directors and officers of the employer, about the
employer's business operations and present and future weaknesses
in the value of its
219 stock that do not threaten the continued viability
of the business?
Other courts have also struggled to establish the level of
In the Enron
affirmative disclosure required by fiduciaries.
ERISA litigation, the court held that while the question of a
fiduciary's duty to disclose information was a developing area of
law, the plaintiffs were able to state a claim that the fiduciaries
had a duty to disclose information to the plan participants. 22 0 The
Seventh Circuit has held that fiduciaries are not required to
"continuously gather and disclose nonpublic information bearing
some relation to the plan sponsor's financial condition."12' The
Northern District of Georgia held that just because part of the
ERISA plan is invested "in employer stock does not mean that the
ERISA fiduciary duty to disclose plan-related information to
beneficiaries is transformed into a general duty to disclose the
financial details of the business: some sort of 'special circumstance'
will be required to trigger these heightened obligations."2 While
the exact level of disclosure required of ERISA is still unclear, it is
known that ERISA fiduciaries have a greater affirmative duty of

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Pa. Fed'n, Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Norfolk S. Corp.

Thoroughbred Ret. Inv. Plan, No. 02-9049, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 296, at *910 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2005).
220. Tittle v. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d. at 557.

221. Cokenour v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 7921, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5286, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004).
222. Hill v. BellSouth, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.
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disclosure than defendants generally have in securities fraud
cases.
B. Scienter Required in Securities FraudCases, but Not ERISA
Securities law liability requires an element of scienter, while
ERISA liability arises from a breach of fiduciary duty and does not
require intent. As discussed above, in order for a plaintiff to
successfully make a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with scienter."'
Scienter has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as the
"intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."2
While liability in
securities fraud cases requires an element of intent, liability in
ERISA stock drop cases arises from a breach of fiduciary duty, and
does not require that the fiduciary act with scienter in order to be
held personally liable.'
This different standard can result in
different outcomes for defendants who are sued under both
statutes for the same conduct. An individual who did not act with
the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud could not be held
personally liable under Rule 10b-5. But if that same action was
not that of a "prudent" person, he could be held liable for breach of
ERISA fiduciary duty.
C. Securities Liability Is Tied to the Purchaseor
Sale of a Security, While ERISA Liability Is
Not Necessarily Tied to a Transaction
Liability under Rule 10b-5 must be in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, 6 while arguably, some courts have
held that ERISA liability can arise from the failure to disclose
information that a reasonable person would have wanted in
making plan investment decisions. 7 As with the element of
scienter, this could lead to split results in some situations. For
example, if a plan fiduciary knew that the company was facing
financial troubles, yet encouraged plan participants to continue to
leave their ERISA plan investments in company stock, they could
be held liable even if the plan participants never bought or sold
any shares.' However, in the same situation, the fiduciary would
not be liable to shareholders that were not plan participants

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731; 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
Glaziers & Glassworkers, 93 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Bixler, 12 F.3d at

1299).
228. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 489.
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unless the shareholder actually bought or sold shares based on the
229
fiduciaries fraudulent statements.
D. Only FiduciariesCan Be Liable Under ERISA
Only fiduciaries can be liable under ERISA, while there is no
fiduciary requirement for securities law. Any individual who
violates the elements of Rule 10b-5 can be held accountable for
securities fraud.3 0 In addition, board members cannot completely
delegate away the duty-even by appointing an outside body or
committee to administer the plan. Under ERISA, a person is a
fiduciary to the extent that he or she exercises any discretionary
authority or control over the management of the plan or the
management of its assets or has any discretionary authority or
responsibility for the administration of the plan.3 1 In Kling v.
Fidelity Management Trust Co., the court held that the power to
appoint fiduciaries is a fiduciary function and implicit in the
power to appoint is the duty to monitor."'2 Other courts have also
held that officers and directors have a duty to monitor fiduciaries
appointed to administer an ERISA plan.' Even if board members
delegate away the responsibilities for administering and managing
the plan, they still have a duty to monitor those that they have
appointed.
E. Duty of Loyalty Held by ERISA FiduciariesIs Extremely High
Fiduciaries (including corporate board members) of ERISA
plans have a duty of loyalty and duty of care. Board members also
have a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to their shareholders.
However, the standard for those duties differs significantly.
The duty of loyalty requires an ERISA fiduciary to discharge
his duties solely in the interest of the plan participants23 and
"with an eye single to" the beneficiary.2 5 Most states have created
either a statutory or common law duty of loyalty for corporate
However, the duty of
board members to their shareholders.
loyalty for directors is "to refrain from engaging in his personal
activities in such a manner as to injure or take advantage of his
corporation."236The duty of care under ERISA requires that the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754-55.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
Kling, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
See, e.g., In re Elec. Data Sys. 1, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 671.

234. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(a).
235. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271.
236. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BALEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
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fiduciary act "with care, skill, prudence and diligence that a
prudent man would use"237 and "to make decisions with a singleminded devotion to a plan's participants." 2' Directors have a duty
of care to shareholders, which is measured by the business
judgment rule. They must act "on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.""
These differing standards of care
require that a director or officer exercise great concern when
taking action in a fiduciary status to ERISA beneficiaries. A
director does not receive the same deference under ERISA law
that he does while exercising his general business duties.
F. Level of Pleadingsfor Security FraudIs Much More Difficult
Pleadings for fraud under securities law are fact-specific and
must meet the heightened fraud pleading requirements, while
ERISA claims based on breach of fiduciary duty do not necessarily
trigger heightened levels of pleading. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, when making a fraud claim, "the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person
may be averred generally."24 This heightened level of pleading
can make it difficult for plaintiffs in securities cases to withstand a
motion to dismiss. However, several courts have held that a
plaintiff alleging a breach of ERISA fiduciary duty does not have
to meet the heightened fraud pleading requirements if their claim
alleges a breach not based on fraud. 4'
G. The PSLRA Can Stay Discovery While a
Motion to Dismiss Is Pending
Private securities fraud actions must meet the stringent
PSLRA requirements.
One way in which Congress tried to
minimize the impact of meritless securities lawsuits was to stay

OFFICERS AND DIREcToRs § 1.05 (7th ed. 2004).
237. Morse, 732 F.2d at 1145; 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
238. Morse, 732 F.2d at 1145.
239. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 236, § 1.06.
240. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
241. See In re Elec. Data. Sys. 1, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (stating the plaintiff

needs to meet Rule 9(b) requirements when the claim was based on a duty to
disclose); Nelson, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2431 (holding allegations of alleged
breach of duties of loyalty and prudence, as well as alleged failures to disclose
information to ERISA are not subject to Rule 9(b)); Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at
865 (Rule 9(b) is not applicable to ERISA cases where the plaintiff alleges
breach of fiduciary duty and not fraud). See also In re Xcel Energy, 312 F.
Supp. 2d at 1165; In re La.-Pac. Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645.
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discovery while any motions to dismiss were pending.242 Under
ERISA, as in most other civil litigation, discovery may proceed
These different discovery standards can cause
immediately.
conflict in situations where both shareholders and plan
beneficiaries have filed a civil suit. If the defendant files a motion
to dismiss, discovery should theoretically be stayed in the
securities fraud suit, but may continue in the ERISA suit. This
dual standard raises the possibility that defendants will file a
parallel ERISA suit in order to get discovery during a stage in the
proceedings that they would not be allowed discovery during a
typical shareholder fraud suit.
VI. DIFFERENT STANDARDS COULD LEAD TO THE
DOWNFALL OF ERISA PLANS

No employer is required to offer his or her employees a
retirement savings plan; yet if they do offer a plan, it must comply
ERISA was enacted with good motives; the
with ERISA.'
government wanted to protect employees from potential abuse at
the hands of employers. However, the recent rash of ERISA stock
drop cases could end up harming employees in a significant way.
Employers who provide ERISA plans face a high level of fiduciary
duty when managing the plan, higher than the company's duty to
its shareholders. If it becomes too expensive for employers to
provide employees with the retirement benefits, both because of
the costs of litigation and because of the cost of complying with
two different sets of legal standards, employers may choose to
simply stop providing their employees with retirement benefits.

242. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b).
243. A retirement plan must only comply with ERISA if the employer wants
it to be eligible for tax benefits. See, e.g., Morton Mintz, Beware of Pension
Eligibility Rules, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1987, at R26.
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TABLE A: FIRST CIRCUIT

Case Name/

Parallel

Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Lalonde v.
Textron, Inc.2'

Outcome

Reasoning

Defendant
ESOP's
motion to
dismiss
overturned,
Defendant
directed
trustee's
motion to

With respect to ESOP,
the court held that
additional record
needed to be developed
to determine if this was
a case where the
presumption of
reasonableness of ESOP
fiduciary may be

dismiss

overcome. 245 With

affirmed.

respect to the directed
trustee, the plaintiff did
not allege any facts that
the directed trustee had
knowledge of the
defendant's
malfeasance, and
therefore could not be
held liable."

In re Tyco
International,
Ltd.
Multidistrict
Litigation.247

Defendants'
motions to
dismiss were
granted in
part and
denied in part.

The ministerial
employees on the plan
committee were not
fiduciaries.' The
employer was not a
fiduciary due to its plan
administration. u9
Although the
employer's board
members were
fiduciaries, the parent
was not a fiduciary

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

369 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004).
Id. at 4-6.
Id. at 7.
No. 02-1335-PB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24272 (D.N.H. Dec. 2, 2004).
Id. at *13.
Id.
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Parallel
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Case

Outcome
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Reasoning

based on its securities
filings. 5 ' The complaint
did not contain enough
facts to show that the
parent should be held251
liable as an alter ego.

The court did not
dismiss the claims
against the parent
based on misstatements
by its former CEO to
determine if the
employer had
respondeat superior
liability for its
employees' acts related2 2
to the plan committee;
if the defendants could
use the defense under
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c);2 53 or
if the misstatements
and failures to disclose
were actionable. 4 The
complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action
for negligence based on
an imprudent
investment.25'
Kling v.
Fidelity
Management
Trust Co. 2 56

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
denied in part.

*11.
*25.
*26.
*27.
*28.
*32-33.

256. 323 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2004).

The company and
members of the pension
committee had a
fiduciary duty to
monitor appointed
fiduciaries and a cofiduciary duty to
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Case Name/
Jurisdiction

Parallel
Securities
Case

Lalonde v.
Textron, Inc.260

Stein v.
Smith.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Yes

Outcome

Reasoning

provide accurate
information about
investments.257 The
allegations against the
savings plan were
dismissed because the
plan could "not be both
a plaintiff and
defendant in the same"
case.258 The directed
trustee had a fiduciary
duty to "distinguish
between proper and
improper
instructions.""
The directed trustee
Defendant's
was not a fiduciary with
motion to
respect to its purchases
dismiss
of employer stock."'
granted.
Overturned in The drop in the
part on
employer's stock was
not enough to rebut the
appeal.
presumption that the
ESOP acted reasonably
in continuing to hold
the employer's stock.62
The plaintiffs alleged
Defendant's
facts sufficient to
motion to
withstand a motion to
dismiss
dismiss because they
granted in
part and
"claimed that any
denied in part. defendant with a
fiduciary duty to
monitor and evaluate
the performance of

Id. at 144.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 150.
270 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.R.I. 2003).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 280.
270 F. Supp. 2d 157 (D. Mass. 2003).
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Reasoning

Outcome

[company] stock as an
investment option for
one or both of the plans
breached that duty
because he or she
allegedly knew or
should have known of
problems within the
[c] ompany."2" The
plaintiffs' claims based
on co-fiduciary liability
were dismissed as
"inadequately pleaded,"
and the claims against
the officer were
dismissed because he
_was

264. Id. at 167.
265. Id. at 175.

not a fiduciary."
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TABLE

Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case
Henry v.
Champlain
Enterprises,
Inc."

Crowley v.
Corning,Inc.'

B: SECOND CIRCUIT
Outcome

Reasoning

Complaint
dismissed
against
certain
defendants.
Judgment
against
remaining
defendants.

"U.S. Trust ... failed to
demonstrate
entitlement to the
adequate consideration
exception. The sale of
convertible preferred
stock to the ESOP,
accordingly, was a
prohibited transaction

Plaintiffs
motions to
amend his
complaint and
alter judgment
denied.

Neither the company
nor the board of
directors was a
fiduciary under the
plan. 9 While the
benefit committee was a
fiduciary, the plan itself
directed that one
investment option must
be investor stock, and
the committee did not
breach its duty by
continuing to offer the

under ERISA."62 7

stock.27 °

In re
WorldCom,
Inc. ERISA
Litigation.271

Settlement
approved,

Plaintiffs and all
defendants except
Merrill Lynch and
Sullivan reached a
$47.15 million cash
settlement that was

266. 334 F. Supp. 2d 252 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
267. Id. at 274.
268. No. 02-CV-6172 CJS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 758 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14,
2004).
269. Id. at *13.
270. Id. at *18-20.
271. No. 02 Civ. 4816(DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20671 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
2004).
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Jurisdiction

In re
WorldCom,
Inc. ERISA
272
Litigation.

Beam v.
HSBC Bank
USA. 276

Parallel
Securities
Case

Yes

Outcome
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Reasoning

approved by the court
on October 18, 2004.272
Defendant's
A fiduciary under
motion to
ERISA is a functional
dismiss
status. Officers that
granted in
did not act as nor were
part and
appointed as fiduciaries
denied in part. could not be held liable.
Incorporation of SEC
filings into summary
plan descriptions is not
enough to create
fiduciary status.274
However, a fiduciary
cannot "forget"
information he has
learned in his corporate
capacity, and an ERISA
fiduciary may not
knowingly disseminate
false information to
plan participants.2 75
Defendant's
Factual issues
motion for
precluded summary
summary
judgment for the
judgment
trustee and outside
denied.
directors.277 The outside
Plaintiffs
directors were
motion for
fiduciaries under
partial
ERISA.2 8
summary
judgment is
granted.

272. Id. at *11-13.
273. 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (settlement approved by WorldCom
11, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20671).
274. Id. at 760.
275. Id. at 765.
276. No. 02-CV-0682E(F), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15744 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 19,
2003).
277. Id. at*11-12.
278. Id. at *11.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Outcome

Reasoning

Crowley v.
Corning, Inc.279

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted.

The plan sponsor did
not act as a fiduciary."'

Koch v.
Dwyer. 8 '

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

The motion to dismiss
was denied because the
action was not time
barred, the successor
trustee was a fiduciary,
and the earlier
litigation did not bar
the plaintiffs action
against the chairman
and officer.82

279. 234 F. Supp. 2d 222 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
280. Id. at 231.
281. No. 98 Civ. 55519 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11101 (S.D.N.Y. July
22, 1999) (class certified by Koch v. Dwyer, No. 98 Civ. 55519, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4085 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2001)).
282. Id. at *11-39.
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TABLE C: THIRD CIRCUIT

Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Outcome

Reasoning

Glaziers &
Glassworkers
Union Local
No. 252
Annuity Fund
v. Newbridge
Securities,
Inc.' 3
Moench v.
Robertson.'

Grant of
summary
judgment for
defendant on
ERISA claims
overturned
and
remanded.
District court's
order granting
defendant's
motion for
summary
judgment
vacated and
case remanded
for further
proceedings.

Material issue of fact on
fiduciary duty
remained.'

Pennsylvania
Federation,
Brotherhoodof
Maintenance
of Way
Employees v.
Norfolk South
Corp.
Thoroughbred
Retirement
Investment
Plan."

Court granted
parties' cross
motions to
certify
controlling
questions of
law.

ESOP fiduciaries who
invest in employer stock
are entitled to a
presumption that it
acted consistently with
ERISA; however, the
presumption may be
overcome if the plaintiff
can establish that the
fiduciary abused its
discretion."

The court granted the
motions because there
were substantial
grounds for difference
of opinion as to (a) the
specificity that is
required in pleading
facts; (b) whether an
exclusive duty was
breached when a
fiduciary only took
actions that were
dictated; (c) whether a
claim that officers and
directors had superior

283. 93 F.3d 1171 (3d
284.
285.
286.
287.

Cir. 1996).

Id. at 1182.
62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 571-72.
No. 02-9049, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 296 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2005).
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Case Name/

Paralel

Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

In re ScheringPlough Corp.
ERISA
Litigation.' 9

Pennsylvania
Federation,
Brotherhoodof
Maintenance
of Way
Employees v.
Norfolk South
Corp.
Thoroughbred
Retirement
Investment
Plan.291

Outcome

Reasoning

_________

knowledge of weak
stock prices was enough
to allege a breach; and
(d) when the
presumption should
have been applied.2"
Defendant's
Plaintiffs did not state a
motion to
claim under § 1132(a)
dismiss
for plan-wide relief
granted.
since each participant
had the option to invest
in company stock, and
they are looking only
for individualized
relief.'
Defendant's
Plaintiffs did not
motion to
adequately state a
dismiss
claim for violation of
granted in
ERISA's exclusive
part and
purpose requirement.292
denied in part. Plaintiffs stated a
sufficient claim for a
breach of ERISA's "duty
to provide clear,
accurate, and
understandable
information to the Plan
participants";' and
ERISA's duty of
prudence. They alleged
that the employer, plan,
officers, plan managers,
and plan trustee "knew
or should have known

288. Id. at *5-6.
289. No. CivA. 03-1204, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16265 (D.N.J. June 28,
2004).
290. Id. at *30-31.
291. No 02-9049, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1987 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2004) (court
later certified controlling questions of law to the Third Circuit).
292. Id. at *12.
293. Id.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Cs
Jurisdiction Securities
Case

Outcome

Reasoning
of some information
that would lead a
reasonable person to
question the prudence
of further investment"
in the employer's stock
fund.

In re IKON
Office
Solutions Inc.
Securities
295
Litigation.

Canale v.
Yegen .

Yes

294

The settlement
amended the plan
"permitting each Plan
participant who ha[d]
at least two years of
service to direct his
employer [to] match
contributions to any of
the Plan's investment
options," and not just in
company stock. 6 The
court approved the
settlement.
Defendant's
Plaintiffs allegations
concerning defendants'
motion to
failure to diversify
dismiss
ESOP assets does state
granted in
a claim for breach of
part and
denied in part. ERISA fiduciary
duties.298
Plaintiffs
motion for
class
certification
granted.
Case settled
August 2002.

294. Id. at *23-24.
295. 191 F.R.D. 457 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (settled by Whetman v. IKON Office
Solutions, Inc. (In re IKON Office Solutions Sec. Litig.), 209 F.R.D. 94 (E.D.
Pa. 2002)).
296. Whetman v. IKON, 209 F.R.D. at 97.
297. 782 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.J. 1992).
298. Id. at 967-68.
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TABLE D: FOURTH CIRCUIT
Parallel
Case Name/
Cs
Jurisdiction Securities

Reasoning

Outcome

The plaintiff stated a

Tatum v. R.J.

Reversed

Reynolds

district court's valid claim for a

Tobacco Co.2

order granting
defendant's
motion to
dismiss and
remanded for
further
proceedings.

In re Duke
Energy ERISA
Litigation.3°'

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted.

Tatum v. R.J.
Reynolds
Tobacco Co.3' 4

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss

potential breach of
fiduciary obligations
according to 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1). The plan's
amendments did not
strip the plan
fiduciaries of "discretion
to redesignate" the
funds at issue as
investment options, and
did not require the
elimination or sale of
the stocks from the
plan .300

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

The ESOP Fiduciaries
were "entitled to a
presumption that
[their] decision to
remain invested in
employer stock [was] a
reasonable one."3 °2
Misrepresentation of
revenues representing
less than one-third of
one percent of
company's revenue is
"immaterial as a matter
of law."3 °'
Defendants' actions
were not subject to
ERISA's fiduciary duty

392 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 640.
281 F. Supp. 2d 786 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
Id. at 794.
Id. at 792.
294 F. Supp. 2d 776 (M.D.N.C. 2003), rev'd, 392 F.3d 636 (2004).
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granted.

Hull v. Policy
Management
Systems
30 7
Corp.

305.
306.
307.
308.

Yes

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted.
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provisions because
those "actions were
performed as part of
settlor functions."3 °5
The court held that the
plan amendment
documents did not give
the defendants as
fiduciaries any
authority to prevent the
sale.3
The plaintiffs
allegations that the
corporation failed to
provide accurate
information were not
based on duties owed by
an ERISA fiduciary.
Rather, they were
based on the "general
duties of disclosure"
owed by an officer of
corporation.3" A
committee with the
authority to make
investment decisions for
a plan does not have a
higher standard of care
with respect to
purchases of company
stock than other stock
purchase, and a
committee cannot be
held liable for failing to
uncover

Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
No. 3:00-778-17, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22343 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001).
Id. at *23-24.
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309. Id. at *26-27.
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TABLE
Case Name/

Parallel
Securities

[38:889

E: FIFTH CIRCUIT
Outcome

Reasoning

Schied v.
Dynegy, Inc.
(In re Dynegy,
Inc. "ERISA"
310
Litigation).

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
denied in part.

In re
Electronic
Data Systems

The court
granted in
and

Allegations that the
fiduciaries knew there
were
misrepresentations in
SEC filings and then
encouraged plan
members who were
interested in investing
in the corporation to
read those filings, and
that the corporation
breached a fiduciary
duty by knowing about
and failing to remedy
alleged fiduciary
breaches by benefit
plan committee were
sufficient to state a
claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.3" ' The
fiduciaries did not
breach a fiduciary duty
by accepting the
corporation's tender of
matching shares for the
retirement plan 1' or for
failure to diversify the
corporation's
contribution of its own
stock."3
Since the claims were
pursued on behalf of the
plan instead of as

Jurisdiction

310.
311.
312.
313.

Case

_part

309 F. Supp. 2d 861 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
Id. at 881-82.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 896.
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the plaintiffs'
motion for
class
certification.

In re
Electronic
Data Systems
Corp. "ERISA"
Litigation."'

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

I

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

224 F.R.D. 613 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 625.
305 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
Id. at 682.

satisfied the
commonality
requirement for class
certification.315 The
releases that the
participants signed
could not defeat the
typicality
requirement.318 As a
separate entity, ERISA
section 404(c) did not
apply. This provision
could only apply to
particular participants
and particular
transactions.317
+
The plaintiffs claim
that the corporation
and its officers failed to
monitor the plan
administrator and
investment committee,
and allegations that the
defendants concealed
information that would
have allowed them to
discover that the
investment was
unsound was
adequately pleaded."'
The heightened
pleading requirements
under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b)
were not applicable,

The John MarshallLaw Review

Case Namel
Jurisdiction

Parallel
aale
Securities
Case

Outcome

[38:889

Reasoning
because the alleged
breach of a fiduciary
duty to inform were not
necessarily fraud
32
allegations.

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
denied in part.

In re Reliant
Energy ERISA
Litigation.2'

Tittle v. Enron
Corp. (In re
Enron Corp.
Securities,

Yes

The plaintiff did not
have standing to sue
the defendant
subsidiary, since the
plaintiff never worked
for the subsidiary and
never participated in
any of the subsidiary's
benefits plan.322 The
district court found that
even though the
defendant parent had
power to appoint and
remove its benefits
committee members,
this did not make the
parent a fiduciary. The
plaintiff had properly
alleged that the
parent's benefits
committee members
were ERISA
fiduciaries.2 3
"Respondeat superior
... [was] a viable
theory of24liability under
3
ERISA.
An ESOP fiduciary is
Defendant's
entitled to a
motion to
presumption of
dismiss on
ERISA claims reasonableness when

320. Id. at 672.
321. 336 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

322. Id. at 654.
323. Id. at 658.
324. Id.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Outcome

Derivative &
"ERISA"
825
Litigation).

denied.
Settlement
pending.

Thompson v.
Avondale
Industries,

Judgment in
favor of
defendants;
plaintiffs
claims
dismissed,

Inc.327

Reasoning
investing in employer
stock. Corporate
directors have a duty to
monitor plan
fiduciaries, and
fiduciaries have a duty
to communicate
material information to
employees. A directed
trustee duty may be
held liable when the
trustee knows or should
have known about the
directing fiduciary's
breach.326
Plaintiffs failed to prove
that any of the
defendants breached
their fiduciary duty,
because the plan
allowed the
administrative
committee to diversify,
and certain "sales were
prudent means of
diversification..328

325.
326.
327.
328.

284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
Id. at 560-82.
No. 99-3439, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2318 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2003).
Id. at *18.

The John MarshallLaw Review
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TABLE F: SIXTH CIRCUIT
Parallel
Case Name/
Outcome
Cae_________
Jurisdiction Securities
Case

Chao v. Hall
Holding Co. 32 9

District court
decision
granting
plaintiffs
motion for
summary
judgment.

Landgraffv.
Columbia/
HCA
Healthcare
Corp. of
America."'

Dismissal of
plaintiffs
claim
affirmed.

Hunter v.
Caliber
Systems.33 '

Summary
judgment in
favor of
defendant
affirmed.

285 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 444.
230 Fed. Appx. 366 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 368.
220 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2000).

Reasoning
Because the fiduciaries
did not engage in a good
faith determination of
the fair market value of
the stock, the definition
of "adequate
consideration" required
by ERISA was not
satisfied.33' The
fiduciaries "had
provided no authority to
show that the district
court erred in awarding
money damages to
compensate the
participants" in the
employee stock
ownership plan.33'
The plaintiffs failed to
establish that a
reasonable fiduciary
would have determined
that investment in
company stock was
imprudent, and as such
failed to rebut a
presumption of
reasonableness.
The administrator of an
ERISA plan could not
be liable for failing to
diversify the plan
assets, since the plan
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Prle
Name/
Case
Casicaien Securities
Cs
Jurisdiction
Case

Outcome

Reasoning
trustee had sole
responsibility for
diversifying plan
investments under
ERISA, and the Trust
Agreement also
assigned responsibility
to trustee for
diversification."

Kuper v.
Iovenko. 36

Judgment for
defendants
affirmed.

The defendants did not
act improperly in failing
to distribute stock
under an ESOP, or in
failing to diversify
ESOP funds. Purely
business decisions by
an ERISA employer are
not governed by the
337
fiduciary standards.

In re AEP
ERISA
8
Litigation.3

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

335. Id. at 722-23.
336. 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995).
337. Id. at 1456-58.
338. 327 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Ohio 2004).

Plaintiffs do not need to
meet heightened
Federa; Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) pleading
rules. Material
information regarding
stocks could be
disclosed without
violating federal
securities laws.
Exercised authority
over an employee
benefit is enough to be
held liable as an ERISA
fiduciary. Other issues
raised by the
defendants were best

[38:889

The John Marshall Law Review
Case Name/

Parallel

Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Outcome

________________

Reasoning
decided at a later stage
of litigation.'

In re CMS
Energy ERISA
Litigation.340

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
denied in part.

Rankin v.
Rots.m

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

The failure of officers
and directors to
eliminate employer
stock as an investment
option did not breach
fiduciary duties. 1
Allegations that
employer's officers and
directors were aware of
improper trading
practices but took no
action to prevent other
fiduciaries from
continuing to invest in
employer stock; that
administrators of a plan
conveyed misleading
information; and
allegations that
employers and directors
failed to monitor plan
fiduciaries were
sufficient to state a
claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. 2
Defendant's motions
were "a veiled attempt"
to get summary
judgment at the
pleadings stage.'
Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) is not
applicable to ERISA

Id. at 821, 825.
312 F. Supp. 2d 898 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
Id. at 907.
Id. at 902-04.
278 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (K-Mart ERISA Litigation).
Id. at 879.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Cs
Jurisdiction Securities

Outcome

Reasoning

Case

cases where plaintiff
alleges breach of
fiduciary duty and not
fraud. 5 ESOP
fiduciaries are
"expected to administer
ESOP investments
consistent with the
provisions of both a
specific employee
benefits plan and
ERISA." 4

345. Id. at 865.
346. Id. at 878-79 (quoting Moench, 62 F.3d at 569).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:889

TABLE G: SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Outcome

Keach v. U.S.
Trust Co. 3 47

Judgment
entered in
favor of
defendants
and against
plaintiffs,

Howell v.
Motorola,
Inc. 349

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
dismissed in
part.

Reasoning
The chairman and
executives did not
attempt to conceal
material information or
knowingly make less
than a full disclosure of
such information to the
trustee and the due
diligence team. In
addition, "the ESOP did
not pay more than
adequate
consideration."348
Nothing suggested that
the committee had any
reason to investigate
the company's allegedly
imprudent transactions,
and a co-fiduciary
theory did not apply.
Therefore, claims
against the committee
and its members were
dismissed. ° Prior to a
more fully developed
factual record, claims
against the employer
based on a respondeat
superior theory were
not dismissed.351 The
plaintiffs claim that the
defendants failed to
monitor the committee

347. 313 F. Supp. 2d 818 (C.D. Ill.
2004) (defendants' motion for fees denied
by Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., N.A., 338 F. Supp. 2d 931 (C.D. Ill.
2004)).
348. Id. at 823.
349. 337 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
350. Id. at 1085-86.
351. Id. at 1095.
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Paralel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs

Outcome

Reasoning

Case

Armstrong v.
Amsted
Industries,
Inc. 354

Cokenour v.
Household
International,
Inc.'

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

was sufficiently pled, as
were allegations that
the vice president and
director of benefits
knew about, and should
have prevented, the
distribution of
inaccurate
information.352 The
allegations that the
chief financial officer
exercised discretionary
authority or control
respecting management
of the plan or
management or
disposition of its assets
"stated a colorable
claim" that he was a
fiduciary.3"
Summary
The purchase of a
Judgment
corporation was a
granted in
business decision that
favor of
did not trigger ERISA's
defendants.
fiduciary duty."
Defendant's
Plaintiffs failed to meet
motion to
heightened pleading
dismiss
requirements regarding
granted in
their claim of
part and
intentional
denied in part. misrepresentation. 57
The plaintiffs' claims
regarding the plan
committee's, its
members', the

Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1101.
No. 01 C 2963, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14776 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2004).
Id. at *19.
No. 02 C 7921, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004).
Id. at *21.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Outcome

Reasoning
employers', and its
executive's alleged
omission to disclose
nonpublic information
was passive behavior
too broad to fall under
ERISA's disclosure
provisions."s The
allegations based on cofiduciary liability were
not sufficient to state a
claim."s 9 Plaintiffs duty
of prudence allegations
were sufficient to
survive a motion to
dismiss.'

In re Sears,
Roebuck & Co.
ERISA
Litigation.1

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
denied in part.

The determination of
whether Sears is an
ERISA fiduciary, issues
of loss causation, and
the fiduciary duty to
monitor are factual
matters "not properly
resolved on a motion to
dismiss." 2 Plaintiffs
stated a claim against
the investment
committee "for causing
the plan to continue to
acquire and invest...
in matching
contributions of Sears'
stock."' Plaintiffs did
not sufficiently make
allegations to "put
[dlefendants on notice

Id. at *24.
Id. at *30.
Id. at *29.
No. 02 C 8324, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3241 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004).
Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *13.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case

Outcome

Reasoning
of the particular
charges against each
Defendant" regarding
co-fiduciary liability.'

Steinman v.
Hicks."

Judgment for
defendants
affirmed.

The decision to transfer
trust funds from one
trust to another, which
typically occurred
pursuant to a corporate
merger or
reorganization, was not
a fiduciary act.8

Nelson v.
Ipalco
7
Enterprises."

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

Keach v. U.S.
Trust Co.,
N.A. 370

Plaintiffs
motion for
summary
judgment

The directors were
ERISA fiduciaries, as
the directors, in
appointing ESOP

granted in

trustees "exercised de

"The question of
fiduciary capacity for
such statements" made
by individuals holding a
dual role "cannot be
resolved as a matter of
law on the pleadings.""
Allegations of alleged
breaches of duties of
loyalty and prudence,
as well as alleged
failures to disclose
information to ERISA
are not subject to Rule
9(b).

9

364. Id. at *24.
365. 352 F.3d. 1101 (7th Cir. 2003).
366. Id. at 1105.
367. IP02-0477-C-HIK, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2431 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 13, 2003).
368. Id. at *11.
369. Id. at *11-13.
370. 234 F. Supp. 2d 872 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (case tried and decided in favor of
defendants, 313 F. Supp. 2d 818 (C.D. Ill. 2004)).
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II-&I"'aV'
Jurisdiction

Securities

Case

Outcome

Reasoning

facto control over the
part and
denied in part. plan assets."37'
Summary judgment
was not granted on the
issue of whether the
duty was breached,
because the simple fact
that the directors
admitted they failed to
adequately disclose
their knowledge of the
investigation did not
show what they did
know sufficiently to
grant summary
_udgment. 72

371. Id. at 881.
372. Id. at 883-84.
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TABLE H: EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Cs
Case
Maniace v.
Commerce
Bank of
Kansas City,
N.A.37 3

Outcome
Summary
udgment for
defendant
affirmed.

Reasoning
The directed trustee
had no discretion, and
therefore "could not be
a fiduciary (nor breach
fiduciary duties) with
respect to the...
[company] stock" in the
plan.374 Plaintiffs "failed
to establish that...
[the trustee's] handling
of the. .. [Plan] was
contrary to Plan
directives or contrary to
ERISA" and that any of
the committee's actions
actually rose to the
level of being a breach
of fiduciary duty.375

In re ADC
Telecommunications,Inc.,
ERISA
Litigation.

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

The Moench
presumption of
prudence does not
require imminent
financial collapse of the
company, and it would
be premature to invoke
the presumption at the
procedural stage of the
action.377 Pleadings of
other breaches of duty
were sufficient to carry
the action past the
procedural stage.378

373. 40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994).
374. Id. at 267.
375. Id. at 267-69.
376. No. 03-2989 ADM/FLN, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14383 (D. Minn. July
26, 2004).
377. Id. at *19-21.
378. Id. at *22.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Cs
Jurisdiction Securities
Case
In re Xcel
Energy, Inc.,
Securities,
Derivative &
"ERISA"
3 79
Litigation.

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Yes

[38:889

Outcome

Reasoning

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
denied in part.

Plaintiffs do not have to
satisfy heightened Rule
9(b) fraud
requirements.m It is
"premature to
determine... fiduciary
status" and ERISA
disclosure requirements
"at the motion to
dismiss stage of
proceedings." 8 A plan
fiduciary cannot follow
the plan "to the obvious
detriment of the
beneficiary.""' The
defendant's motion was
granted with respect to
duplicative
allegations."

312 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Minn. 2004).
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id. at 1177.
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TABLE I: NINTH CIRCUIT

Name/

Parallel

Case
Jurisdiction Securities
Case
Wright v.
Oregon
Metallurgical
Corp.3

Outcome

Defendants'
motion to
dismiss
affirmed.

Reasoning

The court held that
with respect to the
ESOP, there was no
cause of action for
failure to diversify.3"
Since the company was
not on the verge of
bankruptcy, the
presumption in favor of
an ESOP investing in
company stock was not
overcome.386

With

respect to the directed
trustee, the court held
that a directed trustee
could not have breached
its fiduciary duty by
following the directions
of another fiduciary
that had not breached
its duties. 7
In re
LouisianaPacific Corp.,
ERISA
Litigation.'

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part.

Louisiana-Pacific is not
a plan fiduciary."
Allegations that other
defendants permitted
plan assets to be
imprudently invested
"sufficiently state a
claim for breach of
fiduciary duty."'
These types of claims do
not have to meet Rule

384. 360 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004).
385. Id. at 1098.
386. Id.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id. at 1103.
No. 02-1023-KI, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2003).
Id. at *18.
Id. at *21-22
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Case Name/

Parallel
Securities
Case

Outcome

[38:889

Reasoning
9(b) pleadings
standards.39'

Defendant's
motion to

In re
McKesson
HBOC, Inc.
ERISA
Litigation.92

dismiss

granted with
leave to
amend.

Plaintiffs did not assert
facts showing that the
"fiduciaries abused
their discretion in
continuing to hold.., a
high percentage of
company stock.., prior
to and in anticipation of
the merger."393
Employer did not have
duty under ERISA to
"harm its public
shareholders" by
acquiring company
stock "at greater than
its fair value."3'

Members of an
employer's board were
ERISA fiduciaries.395
The directed trustee
could not be held liable
under ERISA for plan
.1

I.

losses."

391. Id. at *21.
392. No. COO-20030 RMW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2002).
393. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. C00-20030 RMW, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002).
394. Id. at *23.
395. Id. at *31.
396. Id. at *55.
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TABLE J: TENTH CIRCUIT
Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Case

In re Sprint
Corp. ERISA

Litigation.

397

Outcome

Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
granted in
part and
dismissed in
part.

Reasoning

Plaintiffs alleged facts
which, if true, allow a
reasonable inference
that defendants abused
their discretion by
allowing the plan to
continue to invest in
company stock.398 The
SEC filings were
incorporated by
reference into the
summary plan
descriptions distributed
by defendants, and
were required by
ERISA to be truthful.3
Furthermore, even
though the directors
were not responsible for
managing the plan,
their authority to
appoint administrators
created fiduciary duties
to make proper
appointments and
monitor the appointees'
performance.4
Imprudent investment
claims and disclosure
claims against director
defendants and cofiduciary duty claims
against director

397 No. 03-2202-JWL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9622 (D. Kan. May 27, 2004).
398. Id. at *39.
399. Id. at *44-45.
400. Id. at *61-62.
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Parallel
Case Name/
Cs
Jurisdiction Securities
Case

Outcome

Reasoning
defendants and trustee

were dismissed.401
Imprudent investment
claim alleging that
defendants should have
amended the plans was
dismissed.' 2
In re Williams

Cos., ERISA
4°
Litigation.

Defendant
Williams
Companies
and Board of
Directors'
motion to
dismiss
granted.
Defendant
Investment
and Benefit
Committee's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

Since the responsibility
to administer the plan
belonged to the
committee defendants,
the employer, who was
the settlor or sponsor of
the plan, did not act as
a fiduciary.' Claims
against the employer
were dismissed.4 ' 5 The
only abilities that the
director defendants had
under the plan was to
appoint, retain, or
remove committee
members.4° Since the
plaintiff did not allege
that any director
breached a fiduciary
duty that arose out of
the appointment of the
committee defendants,
the court dismissed the
action against the
director defendants.4 7
Allegations that the

401. Id. at*1-2.
402. Id.
403. 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration and alternatively, for leave to amend the complaint denied, No
02-CV-153-H(M), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25042 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2003).
404. Id. at 1338.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1339.
407. Id. at 1343.
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Case Name/

Parallel

Jursdictin Securities
Jurisdiction
Cae
Case

In re Qwest
Savings &
Retirement
Plan ERISA
Litigation.4°

Yes

Outcome

______

Reasoning

benefit and investment
committees breached
their fiduciary duty
with respect to the
financial interests of
plan participants are
sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. 48
The court
The class definition
denied class
should only include the
certification
people who were
"pending
harmed by the breach of
approval of an fiduciary duty.411
appropriately

defined
_class."'

1°

408. Id. at 1342.
409. No. 02-RB-464 (CBS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24693 (D. Colo. Sept. 24,
2004).
410. Id. at *21-22.
411. Id. at *21.

The John Marshall Law Review

TABLE

Parallel
Case Name/
Cs
Jurisdiction Securities
Case
Hill v.
BellSouth
412

Corp.

K:

[38:889

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Outcome
Defendant's
motion to
dismiss
denied.

Reasoning
Plaintiffs alleged
adequate facts to
establish a claim that
defendants breached
their fiduciary duty by
failing to prudently
manage the plan,
disclose facts regarding
the company, failing to
avoid a conflict of
interest, and failing to
monitor plan

investments .

412. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
413. Id. at 1370.

413
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TABLE L: SUPREME COURT AND MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Parallel
Case Name/
Jurisdiction Securities
Case

Computer
Associates
International,
Inc.
Varity Corp. v.
Howe .

Yes

Outcome

Reasoning

Settled
December
2003.414
Affirmed the
appellate
court's
judgment
against the
defendant.

Employer was acting in
its capacity as fiduciary
when it misled
employees.416 Therefore
the employer violated
its fiduciary obligations.
ERISA authorizes
lawsuits for
individualized equitable
relief for breach of
417
fiduciary duties.

414. COMPUTER ASSOCS. INT'L, INC., SEC QUARTERLY FORM 10-Q/A FOR
QUARTER ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2003 15, http'//www.sec.gov/Archives/
(June
14,
edgar/data/356028/000095012304007361/y98170qae10vqza.htm
2004); Charles Forelle, Leading the News: Settlement to End Suits by
Computer Associates Holders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003, at A3.
415. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
416. Id. at 531.
417. Id. at 512.

